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Before any discussion of “surrogacy” policy and practice begins in Canada, it is imperative that we
attend to the very words we use. In general conversation, a “surrogate” is a stand-in, someone
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functioning in lieu of another. To apply this term to a pregnant woman is to make assumptions that
perhaps  y in the face of social, biological, and psychological realities.
A pregnant woman is a pregnant woman, point  nale. What she does with the baby born at the end of
the pregnancy may then determine what her role is and has been in its conception and gestation.
In situations where a woman has been contracted with or without  nancial compensation to
undertake a pregnancy with the child born to be given to another, one might, perhaps, talk of a
“gestational pregnancy” – one woman has had a pregnancy instead of another. But calling that
woman a surrogate is not appropriate.
Moreover, even the word “surrogacy” is contested, with some people urging a distinction between
“traditional surrogacy” (where the woman is genetically related to the child to whom she gives birth)
and “gestational surrogacy” (where the woman is not genetically related to the child to whom she
gives birth).  At the present time, both practices are legally permitted in Canada if the arrangements
are altruistic. Commercial surrogacy is not permitted, but this does not preclude the exchange of
money for “expenses.”
As if things weren’t already muddied and muddled, there has also been an unfortunate and
erroneous con ation of the genetic and the biological, and even a blurring of the social and the
biological, no matter how many individuals claim some parental status.
No matter the genetic source of the growing embryo, a pregnant woman provides a nourishing
environment for it. The woman’s own health, as well as past and present exposures and life
experiences, in uence this environment and underline the importance of biological ties. And while
the cutting of an umbilical cord may sever this biological tie, the way in which a baby is born itself
matters. Vaginal births and those by C-section create di erent exposures that likely in uence the
microbial resistance/susceptibility status of a child throughout the life span.
How we talk of third party reproduction – surrogacy arrangements in particular – involves much more
than simple semantic choices. The words we use in uence how we communicate with each other
about those choices, how we analyze them, and how we craft regulations and laws for them. The
words used can facilitate or silence discussions; they can underlie permissive or restrictive legal
frameworks. And when these discussions also involve private individuals who seek a baby,
transnational corporate entities that seek pro ts from the services they o er, and ethicists and jurists
practicing under diverse codes and regimes, the words matter even more.
In “What’s in a name? Variations in terminology of third-party reproduction,” in Reproductive
BioMedicine Online colleagues and I surveyed the literature on assisted human reproduction. Most if
not all authors – whether they were writing for professional or general audiences, and whether they
emphasized medical, legal, ethical, or any other issue(s) – assumed that the terms they used were
neutral and often overtly claimed not to be making value decisions. But word choice necessarily and
inevitably re ects a perspective, a speci c standpoint. Of the over 20 terms we located to describe the
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woman giving birth to a child that would be handed over to another (individual or couple), there were
many that marked a position. For example, authors describing her as a “hired womb” likely di ered in
their attitudes from those who referred to her as “birth giver” or “birth mother.”
It appears that Quebec now plans to reconsider how it manages and regulates gestational
arrangements, including those where a child is born in another province or country. A consideration
of terminology will be an important prelude to deliberations. Among the naming issues to be
addressed are how to properly identify the woman who gives birth to a child she then gives to
another, and how to ensure coherence with decision-making and policies about naming individuals
on birth registrations and other documents used for identifying individuals. For example, we may
need to consider having certi cates that record parentage and the rights and responsibilities of those
caring for and raising children with whom they have only social (not genetic or biological)
relationships.
As we examine issues of policy and practice concerning gestational arrangements, let’s do what we
can to avoid merely playing with words. Instead, let’s acknowledge that the words chosen will express
the values we want as a society for the best health and wellbeing of women and children. And let’s
choose these words wisely recognizing how loaded they will inevitably be.
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